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The Basic Income has been defined as a relatively small income that the public 
Administration unconditionally provides to all its members as a citizenship right. Its 
principal objective consists on guaranteeing the entire population with an income enough 
to satisfy living basic needs, but it could have other positive effects such as a more equally 
income redistribution or tax fraud fighting, as well as some drawbacks, like the labor supply 
disincentives. In this essay we present the argument in favor and against this policy and 
ultimately define how it could be financed according to the actual tax and social benefits’ 
system in Navarra. The research also approaches the main economic implications of the 
proposal, both in terms of static income redistribution and discusses other relevant 
dynamic uncertainties. 
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The deep economic recession, a high-rise unemployment rate and the budget cutting 
policies implemented in our country have led to a raising poverty and inequality level, as 
well as the number of people consider to be “vulnerable”. There is also an increasing 
consensus about the emergency to revert the situation of those individuals that have 
suffered the most the social precariousness and unequal opportunities for inclusion, in 
every Autonomous Community (CC.AA).  
According to official data, from the first semester of 2008 to the first semester of 2015 –a 
period that could be considered as heavily beaten by the crisis- the number of employed 
people in Navarra has diminished from 316.128 to less than 260 thousand. The 
employment rate, (that we consider to be more reliable than the unemployment rate) has 
established below the fifty percent of employment for the first time since the EPA 
methodology first began.  
Furthermore, 2014 “Survey of Living Conditions” (ECV) of Navarra, collects some results 
that probe the lasting social emergency in our region: the relative poverty rate (measured as 
a 60% of the income per consumption unit median1) has reached a 22’3% in absolute 
values. Regarding ages, the highest poverty rate corresponds to the minors below 16 years 
old whilst they are women who suffer relative poverty the most compared to men. 
The Gini coefficient measures how far is the real income distribution compared to a 
perfectly equal distribution.  Regarding inequality, the Lorenz curve shows the accumulated 
percentages of income received compared to the total percentage of recipients, from the 
poorest to the wealthiest households. Gini index measures the surface between the Lorenz 
curve and the hypothetical absolute equity line, expressed as a percentage of the total 
surface under this line. So, a 0 Gini index represents a perfectly equal distribution, whilst a 
100 index shows complete inequality. According to ECV (2014), Gini coefficient in 
Navarra was 30’42 points, slightly below the Spanish absolute level (35 points) but still 
higher than the UE-27 average.  
                                                                 
1 The median is the value that appears when ordering the number of individuals from the lowest  to the 
highest income and it shows half of them over that value and under it. Therefore its value depends on how 
total income is distributed. In Navarra the median income stands for 10.201 € (ECV, 2014)  
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Once we have been witnesses of the current level of inequality and poverty risk, we need to 
try to develop new policies that would ensure the dignified living of the whole population. 
In this context the Universal Basic Income (RBU) that we will later on define with details, 
plays a significant role for fighting poverty and inequality. According to recent research in 
this matter, Arcarons et al. (2014), defend the pertinence of what they call a “citizenship’s 
Basic Income”, in other words, they propose the implementation of a public income, 
whether universal or guaranteed, for every citizen, no matter its level of income nor social 
position. Even more, these authors estimate this policy to have viability from an economic 
perspective (without distorting too much the current income structure). Beyond anything 
else, the RBU can be understood as a tool for social redistribution. 
Although this policy seems to have a current context, there are many authors who have 
debated for years about this issue. In his book “Public Economics in Action” (1995), A.B, 
Atkinson wrote: “In essence, the scheme considered here consists of the payment of a basic income to 
everyone in the population (with possibly differing amounts according to age). This Basic Income would, in 
the pure form replace all social security benefits”. 
In this essay we will translate this definition of unconditioned citizenship’s basic income 
into the acronym RBU, but keeping in mind that the term ‘Universal’ has some constraints 
when dealing with certain groups of population. Also, the matter of pertinence in its purest 
significance will not be deeply discussed. We will try to focus only in the pros and cons of 
the policy as well as making a simulation of the effect of its implementation (together with 
a tax reform) in Navarra –given that there does not exist any research for this specific 
region-. 
Along the first paragraph, we briefly describe the effectiveness of the social expenditure in 
Navarra and its constraints. In paragraph 2, we define some proposals like the RBU and 
other well known alternatives, as well as laying the foundation stone to construct the 
Universal Basic Income implementation. Then, in the third paragraph we analyze the 
special characteristics of this policy, according to its financing and conditionality. Finally, 
the last paragraphs will try to accomplish the difficult challenge of introducing a tax reform 
in order to finance the extra cost of the RBU, and ultimately shows the major changes 






1.1. Public administration transfer limits 
 Despite the severe economic situation, the described inequality has not been accompanied 
by a decisive intervention from the Public Administrations, in the sense of orienting 
policies to guarantee a minimum and sufficient income to fulfill basic living conditions. It is 
true that there have been some poverty defuse in the oldest ranges of the population, 
thanks to a well defined pension politic and completed with the introduction of 
dependent’s protection measures (LISMI benefits). However, many other policies have 
resulted to be insufficient. This is the case of the transfers to recipients of non-contributory 
benefits, unemployment benefits or basic insertion incomes.  
In contrast with other countries, it’s clearly observed that there is a systematic absence in 
supplying with an efficient minimum income. The combination of the access restrictions 
and low benefit’s monetary amounts has made these Income Guarantees to focus only in 
very narrow collectives, despite the widespread severe context that we described.  
According to CIPARAIIS (Laparra et al., 2015)2, there are several significant factors that 
point out the extreme polarization of our region:  
- 6 over 10 workers are currently long-term unemployed; increasing sevenfold from 
3.600 people in 2008 to 27.000, nowadays.  
- The number of households with one of its members unemployed has moved from 
7.9% in 2007 to 26.1% in 2014 which means a 3,3 times multiplying compared to a 
2,7 in Spanish average. 
- In November 2009 the unemployment protection covered a 78.7% of unemployed 
workers. In 2014, this percentage stands for a 55.2%. 
- During the last year, among total people under relative poverty line (income below 
10.201 €), a 37.8% was employed; this demonstrates the weak tool that working 
labor complies as the well-recognized major tool for fighting poverty.  
- The research also points out a severe economic deterioration of the lowest income 
levels, whose earnings reduced more than a twenty percent during this severity 
period of crisis (2007-2014). 
 
                                                                 
2 “Segundo Informe sobre Desigualad, Pobreza y Exclusión Social en Navarra” (2015)  
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At State level, the EMIN (Malgesini, 2014)3 concludes that an 80% of the interviewed 
population who receives Minimum Income Benefits considers that these transfers do not 
allow having a dignified level of live. Furthermore, they confirm that not everyone who 
needs this basic income has an access to it. One of the mentioned barriers is that the 
process requires a large amount of documentation that cannot be managed by the 
Administration in a reasonable period of time; in some cases the mentioned delay lasts for 
more than one year. 
   
Since they were created, the constant increase in Minimum Income Benefits’ (MIBs) 
financial resources is hiding a loss on its extension and intensity related to the number of 
families in needy conditions and the mean amount received by them. The excessive 
bureaucracy surrounding them implies a risk of access to obtain these benefits, rejecting 
many potential recipients out of the MIBs system and creating a gap in between this needy 
people and the Basic Social Service. As a matter of fact, according to the EMIN there is a 
67% of homeless potential recipient that are not covered by the MIBs. 
Regarding constraints, the next barrier for the MIBs access pointed out by the interviewed 
recipients, has to be with the excessive prerequisites and procedures of the system. 
Ultimately, according to interviewers, the main reasons attributed to the uncovering of the 
MIBs are; “lack of rights consciousness” (67% of respondents), “unknown procedure 
mechanisms” (61%) and “household exclusion instability” (61%). 
 
1.2. Navarra and the situation of its principal MIB: the RIS   
The RIS benefit has been transformed over many years to end up positioned as the main 
MIB in our region.  The RIS has the official objective of covering the essential needs of the 
familiar unit in social exclusion situations and to promote their introduction into the social 
life consisting on a maximum income of an 85% of SMI (Minimum Wage). Moreover, the 
perceiver would have to comply with the following prerequisites: 
- To be in an age between 25 and 65 years old. 
- Legally reside in the Spanish territory. 
- To accredit an effective and continued residence in Navarra during the two years 
before the benefit request. 
                                                                 
3 “European Report on Minimum Income Systems” (2014)  
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- Having a lower than the RIS benefit income during the last semester. 
- To previously apply for any other Public benefit and Social Insurance pension that 
could correspond to him. 
 
Given these compulsory conditions in order to be a RIS recipient, we cannot forget the 
long period of administrative persecution started after being elected and before receiving a 
MIB that ultimately lasts only for six months and renewable if the perceiver is considered 
to maintain it. 
However, there must be some considerations to take into account for understanding the 
functioning of this public transfer. 
Firstly, the conditionality of the RIS, places the recipient in a poverty trap of labor 
disincentive; any other job whose compensation was slightly above the RIS benefit would 
be directly rejected as a matter of rational economic calculation.  In that sense, some 
considerations, as the one made in the income guarantee benefit (RGI) administered in the 
Basque Country, allows the recipient to extend the benefit by progressively reducing it 
when finding a job and thus, does not eliminate the whole benefit at once. The RGI 
follows an implicit idea of non-disincentive job acceptance whereas Navarra’s RIS focuses 
on chasing the recipient to avoid any fraud. 
 
  
1.3. The effectiveness of the social expenditure in Navarra 
Garcia and Raymond (2014)4 analyze the relationship between the economic cycles and 
inequality in Spanish regions comparing different indexes before and after public 
redistribution mechanisms. In particular, differences are very significant when using the 
Gini index. Navarra is a good example of how the income per capita is not always 
correlated with high income redistribution and, in fact, our Administration is one of the 
least income redistributors through public benefits. Although this observation requires a 
closer approach analysis, it certainly gives a clear advice to promote powerful income 





                                                                 




Graph 1. Social expenditure and GDP per capita correlation in Spanish regions 
 
Source: SEEPROS and EUROSTAT (Garcia and Raymond, 2014) 
 
Graph 1 shows the correlation between the public redistribution benefits and welfare and 
the GDP per capita in Spanish regions. Contrary to expectations, there is no clear evidence 
that GDP per capita and public benefit expenditure to be correlated and, what is more, 
there even seems to be an inverse relationship between both variables; being the lower per 
















Graph 2. Income redistribution and GDP per capita correlation in Spanish regions 
 
Source: SEEPROS and EUROSTAT (Garcia and Raymond, 2014) 
 
Graph 2 seems more intuitive to understand the weak correlation there exists in most of 
Spanish regions and especially in Navarra. The research’s methodology in order to measure 
social benefits contribution and their redistribution consists on analyzing panels of tax 
contributors and social benefits recipients in an ex-ante and ex-post individual’s income 
restructuring. Regarding the graph, there is again a counter intuitive fact; although GDP 
per capita in Navarra is one of the highest, it is also one of the regions that redistributes the 
less compared to the others. 
 
Despite the emergency situation suffered during the last years of severity, there does not 
seem to be a real compromise for reversing it. In fact, recent legislative changes in most 
basic MIBs, such as the ones accomplished in 2014 for restraining the RIS accessibility, go 
in the way to maintain or even discourage any further attempt for income redistribution. 
Once we know with details the current need to foster social expenditure and income 
redistribution, it is now time to supply with new effective enhancing policies. 
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2. CHANGING PROPOSALS: THE UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME AND 
ITS ALTERNATIVES 
Monetary social transfers are divided in two main groups; those that are related with the 
progressive quotation of the individual during his job life (these are called contributory 
pensions) and the rest of them are non-quoted benefits for recipients that have not 
accumulated enough quotes to perceive a Social Security pension or have already spent 
them. This second case, the group of non-contributory pensions, is defined by different 
authors (Arriba y Ayala, 2013)5 as a tangle of economic devices composed by some the 
following benefits: the Law of Social Integration of the Disabled people (LISMI), the 
unemployment assistance benefit, social inclusion income, etc. This income maintenance 
system shows a fragmented and uncoordinated distribution that ultimately creates an 
absence of homogeneous criteria for the recipients. Given these limitations, it is not 
surprising that the poverty rate in Navarra has been growing up over the European mean 
during the last years (ECV, 2014).  
The complexity and inefficient Social Security system explains why many potential 
recipients are considered to be outside of the social net ’s rights, whilst there seem to be 
many other “bounty hunters” that take advantage of administrative gaps in order to 
accumulate unnecessary aids; the so called “Mateo Effect”. 
Public administrative costs are too high with respect to the total budget managed in the 
social protection system, not only for the institutions but also for the benefit’s recipient 
who is submitted in heavy checking controls, creating an important vulnerability delay from 
the moment when the aid is claimed to the final acceptance and the ultimate payment.  
The fact that most of these benefits are conditioned to the unemployment, or cannot be 
compatible with being employed, is a major disincentive for obtaining a formal job and 
advocates the worker to move from the real and fiscally organized labor to the “black 
economy” and the tax fraud. This effect is known as the “poverty trap”; the recipient 
knows that he will lose his benefit if he finds a job so there may be case that the worker 
would even reduce his usual spending in order to reach the administration prerequisite.  
Another issue regarding most of the actual benefits entails the recognition by the recipient 
to be in a critical situation of marginalization and stigmatization inside the rest of the 
                                                                 
5“El sistema de garantía de ingresos: tendencias y factores de cambio” (2013)  
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society, originating severe psychological damages. Due to this fear, some people may avoid 
to request for the benefit and automatically exclude themselves from any aid. 
The first proposal to solve these inefficiencies may be to implement a Universal Basic 
Income, hereinafter referred as RBU (from its Spanish acronym, Renta Básica Universal). 
The RBU is referred to be one of the most effective policies against poverty and its 
consequences, as many authors defend and argue in different essays (Arcarons and 
Raventos, 2014)6. It is known to be an unconditioned and universal monetary public 
transfer guaranteed for any citizen without any counterpart nor compromise, and 
independent of other labor or familiar sources and circumstances.  
Our RBU proposal would substitute or integrate any other previous public benefit, 
wherever lower or equal to the proposed RBU, including tax benefits from personal 
income-tax statements and explicit monetary transfers, so it doesn’t sum with the rest of 
existing benefits. This universal basic income would not be subject to any upcoming 
income-tax, whilst the rest of future income revenues will be taxed. No need to say that the 
RBU should not affect other implicit Welfare State benefits, such as public health and 
education. The RBU itself would only affect the rest of public benefits in a way to eliminate 
them and not to modify the existing universal rights. 
Compared to the rest of conditioned benefits drawbacks that have been already described, 
the RBU has important advantages: 
- The administrative costs related to the public resources used for managing and 
inspecting the correct transfer process would be drastically reduced, entailing 
savings both for public institutions and for recipients.  
- Any kind of stigmatization described for conditioned benefits’ recipients would 
automatically disappear as the universality of this basic income makes the whole 
citizenship to be a recipient.  
- The RBU is an automatic and direct benefit, so any previous improper delay on 
receptions disappears; there is anticipation on avoiding the risk of exclusion rather 
than an afterwards-solving. 
- There is no incompatibility with additional income, implying the disappearance of 
the “poverty trap” and any other type of tax fraud as well as promoting following 
acceptances for job offers.  
                                                                 
6 “Un modelo de financiación de la Renta Básica técnicamente factible y políticamente no inerte” (2014)  
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- Ultimately, the RBU implies a mattress that softens the pro cyclical economic 
drawbacks, diminishing its effects and helping to maintain a basic consumption 
level when a recessive spiral arises.  
 
2.1. Critics and disadvantages of the RBU: The labor supply disincentive 
The first usual critics refer to the possible disincentive effect on the employment and the 
labor research effort. This essay will not focus on every detail regarding public benefits 
disincentive on labor supply, however there is a large literature concerning two different 
perspectives; the ones who understand social benefits as the origin of labor supply 
disincentive, and the opposite position. 
The first argument in favor of the non-disincentive defenders is precisely that the RBU 
eliminates, beyond anything, the incentives to work in the black economy. In fact, 
recipients know that possible new income does not make them lose their right for the 
RBU, so there is a direct persuasion out of the informal labor; any worker earning a benefit 
that was close to its previous constraint (no incentive to work any further than that line) 
would automatically see this restriction to disappear.  
There is not even a unique contrasting of any actual public benefit that concludes that the 
disincentive effect occurs straightforward. Probably the most significant experiment 
analyzing this effect is the one carried out by Marx and Peeters (2008)7, in which they 
observe the behavior of a group of Belgium inhabitants benefiting from a lively and 
unconditioned one thousand euro basic income. According to the research, only a small 
proportion of the sample changed its habitudes and its working behavior after the prize 
was given. Those that changed their conditions admitted to have changed them only 
reducing a bit their working attitude but not leaving their job forever. Most of the 
interviewers recognized that the income proportioned them an extra security as well as 
widening their options to plan the future situation.  
 
The next critic comes from the argument that and unconditioned basic income would 
create a “pull factor”; foreign (both from different Spanish regions and outside countries) 
people seeking an unconditioned income, would tend to immigrate to Navarra. In that 
                                                                 
7 “An Unconditional Basic Income and Labor Supply Results from a Survey of Lottery Winners” (2008)  
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sense, the RBU should consequently establish a minimum residence for recipients before 
getting the right8. However, it must be also said that the “pull factor” can be somehow 
contrasted if we analyze the following fact; in the Basque Country, the absolute annual 
increase on immigration fell down right after the introduction of two very generous public 
benefits, the Income Guaranteed Benefit (RGI) and the Auxiliary Housing Benefit (PCV) 
and it continues to be the region with the lowest rate of foreign inhabitants (INE, 2008-
2014).   
Of course this attraction effect would have to be taken into account, because if it occurred 
there would be a serious negative result on the policy viability. So it will be necessary to 
define clearly when the benefit right arises. In that sense, the RBU transfer must be low 
enough to guarantee a minimum migration control and working disincentive, but also 
relatively high to comply with the objective of being a basic subsistence guarantee. 
 
 
2.2. Alternative policies to the RBU: the Negative Income Subsidy (INR) 
 
As defined by the economist Martinez Alvarez (2002)9, “the INR imposes the State the 
obligation to subsidize any citizen that is under a specific income level”. 
 
 The idea behind this policy is similar to the RBU’s; to provide the whole population with a 
guaranteed basic income. In this case, the INR implies to subsidize with a 60% the 
difference between the individuals’ taxable income (BL) and its exempt minimum10. 
Bringing the proposal into a straightforward summary and considering the term of family 
unit (parents and children summed together) as the final recipient, we can define the 
following formula for our INR proposal:        
 
  
                       
  
  [1] 
 
                                                                 
8 This first constraint eliminates the Universality of the RBU to replace it with a conditioned permanence or 
residence. However, we will maintain this term as  a matter of consolidating the ultimate essence of the 
proposal. 
9 “Impuesto Negativo sobre la Renta:  Una solución novedosa y eficiente a la pobreza”  (2002)  
10 We established a 60% subsidy and the 12.000€ exempt minimum as mere references (Actually, the 
minimum exempt on income in Navarra is 11.250 euro).  
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Where “S” is the final monthly after-taxed subsidy received by the unit family, “n” 
represents the number of children covered by the family unit11 and “Y” stands for the 
taxable income (BL) declared in the preceding year. Table 1 shows different examples of 
how much each family unit will benefit (in terms of euro) from the INR subsidy, 
depending on its final taxable income. 
 
Table 1. INR implementation 
Family unit composition Taxable liquid income (Y) Annual subsidy Monthly subsidy 
 Childless low income  9.000,00 1.800,00 150,00 
 Low income with 2 child ren  9.000,00 2.520,00 210,00 
 Childless very low income  4.000,00 4.800,00 400,00 
 Very low income with 2 children  4.000,00 6.720,00 560,00 
 Childless and no income  0,00 7.200,00 600,00 
 No income and 2 child ren  0,00 10.080,00 840,00 
Source: Own elaboration 
If we consider a total 15.000 recipients in each of the three income levels described in 
Table 1, the final cost of this policy could be computed the following way: 
 
- 15.000 low income individuals: 15.000*1.800=27 million €. 
- 15.000 very low income individuals: 15.000*4.800=72 million €. 
- 15.000 no-income people: 15.000*7.200= 108 million €.  
- 5.000 dependent children in each income bracket: 
0.2*(5.000)*(1.800+4.800+7.200)/3= 4.6 million €. 
 
Final cost would amount a total 211.6 million € from which the administration would have 
to determine whether to maintain previous social benefits to these recipients or not.  
 
Although the INR would seem to be much easier to apply and financed compared to the 
RBU, the major problem of introducing it would come from the fact that it doesn’ t fight 
against “black economy”. Any low income recipient would rather choose to work in an 
informal job without declaring its income in order to receive a larger State subsidy. There 
would be also a high benefit for those that do not have any labor or saving income but, 
instead, are owners of a substantial patrimony or heritage from which to benefit and enjoy 
                                                                 
11 Giving a 20% weight to children is an  index used by the OECD as an equivalent scale to estimate family 




good living conditions. Thus, an apparently redistributing measure can ultimately turn into 
a subsidy transferred to the least needing individuals, reinforcing again the Mateo Effect.  
  
 Therefore, the mechanisms to administer this shortcoming can only come from the 
demand and supervision of the declared income by the public institutions implying an 




3. THE RBU CONSIDERATIONS AND COST SAVINGS: FIRST STEPS 
OF FINANCING  
 
The major problem arising when dealing with the RBU has to be its cost of financing. It 
seems intuitive that providing the whole population with an unconditioned basic income 
would be economically untenable, but, let us try to firstly define the concrete characteristics 
of the RBU and to estimate the cost of this policy. 
 
In this paragraph we are going to describe the numerous peculiarities of the RBU 
financing. The first clashes arise when the critics consider the cost to be equal to providing 
every single inhabitant with the same RBU amount. This is a common mistake because 
although the whole citizenship is considered to be potentially recipient there would be 




3.1. The youth population and the RBU  
 
The RBU pretends to guarantee a basic and elemental income to the whole citizenship and 
of course young people are not always exempted to basic needs. The fact that these minors 
are commonly integrated in family units under their parent’s custody implies taking into 
account obvious “economies of scale” when sharing common expenses. Therefore, as 
described in the INR paragraph, we will consider their benefit to be a 20% of the normal 
RBU (OECD scale). In that sense, increasing the coefficient to a 30% (Sanzo y Pinilla, 
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2004)12 of the basic income would promote the appearance of new single-parent families, 
which is considered to be one of the most harmed groups during periods of economic 
severity.  
 
There should also be a criterion in order to distinguish between minors and adults. 
According to the income tax deductions, the maximum age to benefit from descendent tax 
reliefs is 25 years old. However, in this proposal we will fix as a requisite to receive the 
entire basic income to be older than 18 years old and emancipated; the principles of the 
RBU imply to cover the basic needs of the whole society but, in the case of the people that 
already live under a parental charge, they do not necessarily change their living conditions 
when becoming adults. Offering a basic income to an adult that lives in a family unit 
housing coverage would imply a perverse non emancipating incentive.  
 
  
3.2. Previous public benefits after the RBU 
 
The RBU implies to substitute any previous benefit and substitute them with the proposed 
basic income whenever they are lower than the new transfer. In cases where current 
benefits are higher (contributory pensions), these pensions will be maintained as a 
complement of the part that exceeds the RBU. For this group of population the RBU has 
no particular effect, but they will receive it as a way to guarantee universality.  
This last statement implies that, as a general rule, the non-contributory benefits are will be 
considered to be under the proposed basic income and thus, all of these social benefits 
would be ultimately swallowed by the RBU13.  
 
3.3. Foreigners and the RBU 
 
As said before, we cannot obviate the risk of a “pull factor” if foreigners are attracted by 
the security net that the RBU offers. Nonetheless, it does not seem acceptable to exclude 
all foreigners (whether national or outsiders) out of the RBU right. As in many other 
                                                                 
12 “La renta básica:  por una reforma del sistema fiscal y de protección social” . (Sanzo y Pinilla,  2004)  
13 There may be the case of some non contributory benefits to be higher than the RBU, for instance the RIS 
can sometimes reach a 100% of the SMI in extreme cases,  however the mean of these social benefits never 
stands above the 426€ ceiling.  
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guaranteed income policies there should be a prerequisite of minimum residency in our 
territory, excluding informal and temporal-stance foreigners (both national and outsiders) 
out of the current RBU right14. The requisite of minimum residency together with a low 
enough quantity would avoid massive migratory movement into Navarra.  
 
3.4. Prisoners and the RBU 
 
The population in intern prison residency would be excluded from receiving the RBU, as 
this group already receives a subsistence guarantee from the public State. During their 
reclusion period they would be outside of the potential RBU recipients. Introducing this 
measure may produce an indirect reduction on the incidence of convictions as there is a 
double penalty in being imprisoned; stop receiving your RBU and condemn your family to 
reduce its disposable income.  
 
 
4. THE RBU COST OF FINANCING 
 
As said before, when computing the final cost of the RBU, it is not the entire population 
who receives the basic income but, instead, we have to find out the equivalent number of 
recipients by applying different reduction coefficients to different groups of the population. 
 
In this sense, we will begin with dividing the population in eight different segments (adults, 
minors, non-emancipated adults, contributory benefits preceptors, unemployment 
contributory benefit, recluses, non permanent foreign residents and, finally those residents 
of Navarra that are currently living abroad) and collect the number of people in each of 
them.15 
 
The weighting coefficient depends also on the group of researched population; adults are 
weighted with a 100% (entire RBU) and minors are weighted with a 0.2 (20% of the RBU). 
                                                                 
14 Excluding the temporal workers guarantees a minimum period of regular taxation and formal working.  
15 The data is obtained from different sources of information; Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 
Instituto de Estadística Navarro (IEN), Consejo de la Juventud, Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales  
(IMSERSO), Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Departamento de Inmigración, Padrón de Españoles  
Residentes en el Extranjero (PERE), etc.  
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However, in order to calculate the cost we also need to consider the exempted groups by 
giving them a coefficient of reduction so as to discount these subgroups out of the wide 
minor-adult groups. In that sense, non-emancipated adults will be weighted with a -0.8 
coefficient (80% saving on RBU cost) and contributory benefit’s recipients, unemployment 
benefit recipients, recluses, non permanent foreign residents and Navarre resident 
population abroad account with a -1 weight (full savings on their potential basic income 
perception). 
 
Table 2. Equivalent population in RBU terms 
   











Non emancipated adults 73.750 
-0,8 
-59.000,00 
Contributory benefits recipients 125.390 
-1 
-125.390,00 






Non permanent foreign residents 24.274 
-1 
-24.274,00 
Navarre resident population abroad 25.862 
-1 
-25.862,00 
        
Equivalent population 45,05% of total   290.343,00 
Source: SEEPROS, INE, Instituto Estadístico de Navarra, CJE and IMSERSO. Own elaboration 
 
The final equivalent population stands for 290.343 people which are equal to a 45.05% of 
the total population in Navarra. This will be the amount we would have to multiply by the 
annual RBU amount in order to compute the total cost of financing the policy for 
Navarra’s Budget.  
 
The initial saving objective is to compensate the new RBU with as many of the current 
benefits as possible, in order to find a sustainable approach. However, if the final  RBU 
benefit results to be insignificant, we would have to conclude that implementing the policy 
is useless; there is no sense in applying a basic income that is far away from subsistence 
living conditions. Therefore, it will be necessary to find out an amount that equilibrates the 
viability of financing with an accepted minimum transfer. As a matter of fact we have 
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already analyzed the possible fears when dealing with a too high unconditioned benefit and 
the risk from the “pull factor” and the labor supply disincentive  too.  
In Table 3 we have gathered some reference amounts regarding actual benefits and other 
official indicators such as the minimum wage, the IPREM, the income-tax personal 
minimum or the dependent spouse minimum, in order to find out an optimal ceiling for 
the RBU. 
 
Table 3.Reference amounts of social benefits  in Navarra 
Reference amounts of social benefits in Navarra Annual  Monthly 
Minimum wage 9.080,40 €  756,70 € 
IPREM 6.390,13 €  532,51 € 
Individual Income tax minimum 3.700,00 €  308,33 € 
Non-contributory unemployment benefit  5.112,00 € 426,00 € 
RIS average 769,68 € 64,14 € 
Maximum dependent spouse benefit  4.735,20 €  394,60 € 
Maximum non-contributory pension 4.402,80 €  366,90 € 
Basic Income (Raventós y Arcarons, 2014)  7.740,00 €  645,00 € 
Proposed RBU (individual) 5.112,00 € 426,00 € 
Proposed RBU (two adults) 10.224,00 € 852,00 € 
Proposed RBU (2 adults and 2 children)  12.268,80 € 1.022,40 €  
Source: SEEPROS, INE, Instituto Estadístico de Navarra, CJE and IMSERSO. Own elaboration 
 
We have finally assumed the RBU to be equal to the standard non-contributory 
unemployment benefit or, what is to say, equal to 426 € per month (an 80% of the 
IPREM). One of the first criterion to define this amount as the optimal ceiling that every 
individual would receive is because it is an intermediate amount in between the lowest 
social benefit (RIS) and the maximum reference (645€). We have also included additional 
reference quantities with different household compositions, where the standard two adults 
and two minors’ family would have a monthly 1.022’4 euro benefit and a 12.268 annual 
transfer payment. 
 
Next step would be to multiply the equivalent population in Table 2 with the RBU amount 
in Table 3. Considering the described groups and their coefficients, the direct estimation of 
the total absolute cost would come from this formula: 
 




Given that the population in brackets sums up to 290.343 individuals, the total amount that 
comes out of the formula gives an absolute initial cost of financing of almost one thousand 
five hundred million euro. This does not mean, of course, that the final cost for the 
General Budget would be this amount. Thereupon, we need to find out where would be 
the savings coming from.  
 
4.1. Sources of financing 
 
The RBU introduction implies to integrate any other existing public social benefit. It is this 
simplification method what makes this basic income so useful in order to guarantee that no 
needy individual will get entangled in the bureaucracy that accompanies this entire Social 
Service network. Simplifying the public benefits’ system has been a desire for many 
researchers in this field16. 
 
Consistently, the first source of automatic financing is represented by all those social 
benefits whose quantities stand under the proposed basic income and that would disappear 
after implementing the RBU. Together with these benefit ’s savings, we have also estimated 
a reduction in some other expenditure items that are not collected in the Government’s 
General Budget but are hand in hand with our proposal:  
 
 Reduction in administrative costs as a consequence of integrating every social 
benefit in a unique RBU. 
 Upcoming earnings from the resurge “black economy” back to the audited 
economy. Although we cannot estimate the entire income to be recovered, this 
item should be also considered as a way of financing.  
 Income Tax deductions and reductions would be fully removed as they would no 
longer comply with their objective of guaranteeing an unconditioned exempted 
minimum17. 
Once again there must be said that these last amounts will be only calculated with 
estimations and are gathered in order to be managed in an ultimate reform simulation. In 
case this policy would ever see the light, a very detailed analysis must be carried out before 
any later implementation.  
                                                                 
16 “Bases para la activación del sistema de garantía de ingresos en España”.  (2014) 
17 Data concerning this item is obtained from the “Departamento de Hacienda de Navarra” (2014).  
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SEEPROS, INE, Instituto Estadístico de Navarra, CJE and IMSERSO. Own elaboration 
Public social benefits (Navarra)   Subgroups  Beneficiaries Monthly mean Annual mean Euros per year 
Contributory benefits Contributory pensions 125390 974 € 11.682 € 1.464.866.167 €  
Non contributory benefits Retirement (Social Secu rity)  1689 353 € 4.237 € 7.156.428 € 
 Disability (Social Security)  942 403 € 4.834 € 4.553.251 € 
 LISMI benefits  126 160 € 1.923 € 242.335 € 
Unemployment benefits Contributory 19463 860 € 10.318 € 200.811.449 € 
 Non contributory (80%*IPREM)  11192 426 € 5.112 € 57.213.504 € 
 Active Insertion Income (Timely)  1511 688 € 8.254 € 12.471.915 € 
In-charged children Causant 12055 
  
141.125.956 € 
 Beneficiary 7495 
  
133.779.454 € 
Maternal aid (Timely)  Maternal and paternal aid  5028 
  
32.435.300 € 
Regional benefits RIS 10227 306 € 3.667 € 37.500.000 € 
 Familiar subsistence aid 
   
36.216.108 € 
Local benefits Basic social services  
   
12.500.000 € 
Dependency care aid  
   
31.890.000 € 
Income tax deductions and reductions  
   
404.727.000 € 
Administrative cost saving  
   
50.000.000 € 
Income from "black economy" 50% of an estimated 528,3 million 
   
264.150.000 € 
    
  
TOTAL 
SAVINGS 2.627.488.868 €  
    
 
A REAL SAVINGS 1.225.961.252 €  




COST 1.484.233.416 €  




COST 258.272.164 € 
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Table 4 represents a summary of all public social benefits collected in groups and 
subgroups. Alongside these groups there is a column for the number of beneficiaries of 
this transfer, a monthly and annual mean of each policy and, finally, the total cost of each 
benefit for the Public Administration. However, not every single benefit has to be 
considered as a saving; contributory benefits -both for pensions and unemployment- 
cannot entail any aid in our financing since the minimum amount for recipients of these 
transfers is always higher than the proposed RBU.  
 
As said before, it is not only public benefits what matters when computing the cost of 
financing the RBU. There are also three other items that we consider to reduce the total 
amount to finance: 
- The income tax deductions and reductions: Given that the RBU fulfills basic 
necessities in every single social group, there would be no need to maintain income 
tax reductions and deductions. It is important to consider the assumptions that 
these two tax reliefs have been introduced with the idea of creating a support to 
finance basic living expenses. Some other reliefs do not even have this priority and 
only seek to compensate transfers that the taxpayer makes with an intention to 
facilitate an activity with official public interests. This last case is specially discussed 
in Navarra, where we have some questionable income tax reliefs such as the 
reductions based on contributions to political parties or the deductions for 
investing on primary residence. 
The second criterion we consider for eliminating these reliefs comes from the fact 
that they are clearly regressive. In the case of income reductions it is evident that if 
we reduce the taxable income before applying any tax rate, the effect could not ever 
be redistributive and so tax reductions benefit the most to those taxpayers that are 
charged with the highest nominal tax rates18.  
 
- Secondly, we have considered an additional saving in the administrative cost of the 
actual Public Administration system. Maintaining a system of conditioned social 
benefits requires a high degree of public control in order to determine where the 
                                                                 
18 There may be other arguments defending that reductions are exempted before applying the corresponding 
tax rate because basic necessities are equal for the whole population, but this reasoning certainly goes against 
the tax principle of the “Ability to pay” which tells that taxation must go in accordance with the income or 
wealth of the taxpayer.  
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right begins or ends. Introducing a RBU and thus eliminating the rest of social 
benefits below it, would imply a saving on current administrative spending. We 
have estimated this saving to be equal to fifty million euro, which is a criterion that 
has been used when analyzing the introduction of the RBU in Guipúzcoa, a region 
whose Public Administration size has similar characteristics to Navarra’s (Arcarons 
et al, 2014)19.  
 
- Finally, the third source of saving comes from the income emerged from “black 
economy” activities. We have already defined the problems of conditioned benefits 
and their implication in the poverty trap. It is evident to consider this advantage of 
the RBU compared to the rest of described benefits; if an individual is not 
constraint to earn an income below the one required by the social benefit, it would 
have no incentive to hide additional earnings coming from non-taxed activities. The 
RBU straightly provides a planning security for future revenues and expenses and, 
thus, the contributor will not feel compelled to tax evasion or frauds.  
Considering the total labor black economy of Navarra to be close to 530 million € 
(Mauleón y Sarda, 2014)20, a good estimation of total earnings coming from this 
item can be computed as a 50% of the entire non-taxed economy. It would be 
naïve to expect a hundred percent of the black economy to disappear since not all 
these activities are related with the poverty trap but also with other issues such as 
undeclared assets, irregular transfers, intra community VAT frauds, etc. 
 
Given the described cost savings we can determine a total real savings of more than one 
thousand two hundred million euro with which to finance our proposal. Not to say that 
there exist too many uncontrolled situations that can modify our previous results and so we 
should be aware that this is only an estimated approach. 
 
Further considerations of increasing savings and costs can come out from other items. For 
instance, according to the fiscal multipliers there should be an indirect effect on the total 
income of a region after higher or lower public spending. Given that the RBU has never 
                                                                 
19 “Una propuesta de financiación de Renta Básica en Gipuzkoa” (2014)  
20 “El Plan de Lucha contra el Fraude Fiscal contempla medidas de concienciación ciudadana.  Economía 




been implemented, it is complicated to assess the effect that it would have in essential 
variables but it would not be hard to assess how significant earnings coming from taxed 
consumption would appear if the whole citizenship is provided with a RBU21.  
 
However, not every single effect can be considered to be beneficial for the economy. As 
we said before, there may be a disincentive effect on labor whose implications can be 
beneficial from workers’ point of view but unprofitable for contracting companies. It is 
evident that the RBU gives the worker a great power of decision against the company; 
precarious or underpaid work would no longer be necessary to satisfy basic necessities and 
can be substituted by more rewarding jobs. The direct effect of this freedom for workers 
can be understood as a direct strike for the firms that seek to maximize profit by 
minimizing their employee’s wages. Although this shouldn’t be a problem for society, it can 
become a detriment in that firm’s taxation and ultimately decrease the income from 
Corporate Taxing. 
 
Giving the workers the power to decide does not only imply a negative effect for the 
economy, in his stead, it could be understood as a freedom for taking the control of their 
own labor force. We assume that providing the society with a basic income will produce a 
disappearing of most precarious jobs that could be substituted with workings that actually 
produce a welfare society (but cannot be currently developed because of its unproductive 
characteristics). In this sense, the RBU would not only involve a basic subsistence support 
for needy groups but also a change in the current productive model where we live in.  
 
 
4.2. Final RBU financing: the Income Tax reform 
 
First thing to say is that the RBU is not completely sustainable without reforming the actual 
fiscal system. As we explained in previous Tables, the RBU has an approximate absolute 
cost of almost one thousand and five hundred million euro, whilst the total  real savings 
from current social benefits, eliminating reductions and deductions, emerging half of the 
actual black economy, etc. stand for a slightly lower amount (more than one thousand and 
two hundred million euro). Given the actual imbalance of cost and savings, there could be 
an RBU amount that made the financing completely sustainable. If we would implement a 
                                                                 
21 Wagner Law 
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RBU with a monthly amount of 350 €, problems of funding would be solved and the direct 
implementation of this proposal would be a fact. However, we said that the benefit transfer 
must be high enough to guarantee basic sustainability and therefore, we should not forget 
what was our first proposal; a monthly RBU of 426€.  
 
The extra needy financing would therefore imply a consistent tax reform. Although we 
default the exact data for this last year (2015), we will use from now own the amounts 
extracted from 2014 Income Tax Statements (Departamento de Hacienda, 2014). In that 
sense, Table 5 gathers the number on income tax statements declared in Navarra, the 
taxable income and the net payable tax divided in different brackets according to their 
taxable income level. 
 
As we can see, the total number of statements summed up to 332.093 people. Given that 
the income tax statement is usually integrated by all members of the family units, we can 
deduct from this estimation that there is a large share of our population that is not 
contained in the Income Tax system; either by a problem of delay or, what is more likely to 
be the case, for not reaching enough income to be compelled to declare. Thus, we will only 
consider the reform to affect to the actual taxpayers. 
 
Regarding the Table it is worth to be shown that a 25% of low income individuals 
represents only for a 0,5% of the total taxable income, whilst the highest income bracket is 
integrated by a 4% of the total taxpayers and summed up more than a 20% of the total 
taxable income.  
 
Table 5. Income Tax distribution in Navarra 
Income brackets 
(€) Number of statements 
Taxable income (million 
€) Net payable tax (m€) 
<3000 75.156 22,63% 32,71 € 0,52% 0,46 € 0,04% 
3000,01-6000 30.491 9,18% 133,51 € 2,14% 1,28 € 0,11% 
6000,01-12000 49.275 14,84% 442,87 € 7,09% 32,04 €  2,77% 
12000,01-18000 47.876 14,42% 713,89 € 11,43% 88,54 €  7,65% 
18000,01-24000 36.525 11,00% 763,24 € 12,21% 114,74 €  9,92% 
24000,01-30000 28.602 8,61% 768,21 € 12,29% 130,99 €  11,32% 
30000,01-45000 36.511 10,99% 1.324,01 € 21,19% 248,57 €  21,48% 
45000,01-60000 14.270 4,30% 733,86 € 11,74% 158,52 €  13,70% 
>60000 13.387 4,03% 1.336,17 € 21,38% 381,92 €  33,01% 
Total 332.093 100% 6.248,47 € 100% 1.157,06 €  100% 





The nominal tax rates of each of those nine brackets were the following; 13%, 22%, 25%, 
28%, 36%, 40%, 42%, 43% and 44%. However, it is not the nominal rate what matters 
when dealing with taxation. What really tells the real cost for taxpayers is the effective 
average tax rate (EATR).  
This EATR is far below the marginal rate in Income Tax for each of the income brackets 
and should be considered as the main point in order to establish a new reform in the 
personal income taxation (IRPF). Operating with the effective average tax rate should be 
the key point to face the restructuring of the fiscal system and so we will modify it in order 
to obtain the additional revenue that we need to finance our RBU proposal.  
 
The initially proposed RBU has been proved to be unsustainable with only considering 
total savings. Thus, it would be necessary to establish certain surcharges in the actual 
Income Tax rates in order to make it sustainable. As we said, the best way to guarantee that 
the system increases its progressiveness would be to sum any additional surcharge straightly 
over the effective average tax rate (instead of modifying the actual nominal taxation).  
 
A first attempt to find a surcharge sufficient enough to achieve the goal of earning the 
extra public revenue to finance the RBU could consist on an equal addition of a 6% in the 
EATR of every level of income and, although this reform might be efficient in the sense of 
covering the extra revenue, it would not be consistent with our proposal since it raises the 
EATR of the lowest income levels similar to the highest levels and breaks with the 
principle of progressiveness. 
  
If our attempt was to make the Income Tax system more progressive and redistributive we 
cannot surcharge the same rate to the highest and lowest incomes. Also because it would 
go in counter of one of the main taxation principles; the “Ability to pay”, this concept 
means that “the burden of taxation should be distributed according to the earnings or 
wealth of the taxpayer”. Thus, it would be incoherent to finance a basic income and 
provide everyone with basic subsistence if we are obtaining the lacking revenues precisely 




The infeasibility of this first proposed surcharge means that we need to find out method 
that enables us to achieve our objectives. If progressivity is our goal, then the direct 
response to the system reform should come from progressively surcharge each one of the 
income brackets. This second proposal seems more appropriate for our objective since it 
would increase the total revenues from Income Tax without damaging the lowest levels of 
income.  
According to this last proposal and we suggest an addition to each bracket with a 
progressive one percent increase in the EATR, starting from a 0% surcharge to the lowest 
income level to reach an 8% increase for the highest. So next step would be to calculate the 
net payable tax obtained after the reform is made. 
 
Given that the lack of revenues is almost equal to 260 million €, we can define a new 
variable (CL2) that stands after the total increase on net payable taxes after the reform. In 
order to fix a general formula for estimating the extra need for financing, we should define 
a parameter that will proceed both as a value and a sub-index. This i variable represents 
both the taxable income bracket and its corresponding surcharge. Given the last 
observations the formula might end up as follows: 
 
                
   
     
   
       [3] 
 
 
Where CL2 is equal to the total ex-post net payable tax, BL stands for the corresponding 
taxable income level; EATR1 is the effective average tax rate and  
   
   
 equals the surcharge 
for each level of income (being i the corresponding bracket). 
 
As we can see in Table 6, there would be a substantial change in the highest levels of 
income whilst the lowest remained unchanged. The Table expresses in annual terms how 
this proposal affects each income bracket and how the mean of the EATR has increased 
from 18% to a 24%, approaching us to more progressive Income Tax systems22.  
                                                                 
22 EATR in different countries: Finland=23’29%, Denmark=37’41%, Sweden=22’01%. (OCDE, 2014)  
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The new net payable tax stands for almost one thousand and five hundred million euro, 
which is slightly more than the total financing need for the RBU23.  
 
With this Income Tax reform, the Administration would get more than enough resources 
to afford the RBU implementation making the proposal to be sustainable. In fact, the 
difference between the net payable tax before and after the reform is more than 300 million 
€, whilst we estimated to require about 260 million € extra revenues (difference between 
total savings and costs).  
 





















<3000 32,71 € 0,46 € 1,41% 0% 1,41% 0,46 € 
3000,01-6000 133,51 € 1,28 € 0,96% 1% 1,96% 2,62 € 
6000,01-12000 442,87 € 32,04 € 7,23% 2% 9,23% 40,90 € 
12000,01-18000 713,89 € 88,54 € 12,40% 3% 15,40% 109,96 € 
18000,01-24000 763,24 € 114,74 € 15,03% 4% 19,03% 145,27 € 
24000,01-30000 768,21 € 130,99 € 17,05% 5% 22,05% 169,40 € 
30000,01-45000 1.324,01 €  248,57 € 18,77% 6% 24,77% 328,01 € 
45000,01-60000 733,86 € 158,52 € 21,60% 7% 28,60% 209,89 € 
>60000 1.336,17 €  381,92 € 28,58% 8% 36,58% 488,81 € 
Total 6.248,47 € 1.157,06 €  18,41% 
 
23,93% 1.495,31 €  




(CL/BL) (2)  
 Source: Own elaboration 
 
Although it may seem straightforward to finance the RBU in the first year, we should 
notice that there is an extra simplification that we have considered in order to estimate the 
cost and savings; to eliminate reductions and deductions. According to our analysis the tax 
reform would be meaningful in the first year, however, in the second year we would need 
to re-estimate the effective average tax rate and reformulate a new surcharge for each 
income bracket in order to achieve a new sustainable financing. The cooperation between 
technicians and politicians is therefore essential in order to evaluate the implications in each 
scenario and to optimize the decision taking. 
                                                                 
23 The Administration could dedicate this extra tax revenue to maintain certain minimum social basic aids for 





5. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE RBU IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Once we have given the steps to make a sustainable tax reform, let us estimate how the 
RBU would affect the distribution of income after being implemented. Table 7 below gives 
an approximation of the total/mean losses and gains on income for every taxed bracket 
after the tax reform is implemented. 
 
Before entering in details, we have to consider the final redistribution as a “zero-sum 
game” in which total gains on each income bracket has to be balanced with a loss in 
another bracket. We are therefore considering that the total revenue that emerged from the 
tax reform would be used to finance the RBU, considering again any result as a mere 
estimation of the possible effects.  
 
















<3000 75.156 -   € -   € 138.714.497 € 1.846 € 1.846 € 
3000,01-6000 30.491 1.335.100 € 43,79 € 56.276.861 € 1.846 € 1.802 € 
6000,01-12000 49.275 8.857.400 € 179,75 € 90.946.256 € 1.846 € 1.666 € 
12000,01-18000 47.876 21.416.700 € 447,34 € 88.364.140 € 1.846 € 1.398 € 
18000,01-24000 36.525 30.529.600 € 835,85 € 67.413.740 € 1.846 € 1.010 € 
24000,01-30000 28.602 38.410.500 € 1.342,93 € 52.790.357 € 1.846 € 503 € 
30000,01-45000 36.511 79.440.600 € 2.175,80 € 67.387.900 € 1.846 € -330 € 
45000,01-60000 14.270 51.370.200 € 3.599,87 € 26.337.962 € 1.846 € -1.754 € 
>60000 13.387 106.893.600 € 7.984,88 € 24.708.220 € 1.846 € -6.139 € 
Total 332.093 338.253.700 €   612.939.932 €   -   € 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In annual terms, the income loss represents the difference between the net payable tax 
before and after the reform. Of course there would be a mean initial loss for every bracket 




The gain from RBU has nonetheless some particular explanations. Unlike the calculations 
of the income loss, regarding gains it is not the whole society who pays for the extra 
financing of the RBU but it is everyone (outside and inside the Income Tax system) who 
receives it. Therefore, in order to compute mean gains, we cannot straightly multiply every 
income statement by its corresponding RBU, but instead there should be a coefficient of 
reduction to compensate the ones who are included in this fiscal system and those that are 
not. According to this, the annual mean gain from RBU for each statement (considering 
every taxpayer to receive the same amount of benefit) would be 1.846 euro; of course not 
every individual would receive this amount but it is useful to consider it in order to find the 
net results.  
 
Finally, the last step would be to calculate how the net results are distributed. As we see in 
Table 7, we will consider the mean net result of each statement so as to estimate the 
individual gains or loss of the different representative income levels.  
 
According to Graph 4, there would be no individual loss until we reach the last levels of 
taxable income. In fact they are only the highest levels of income the ones that are clearly 
harmed by the RBU proposal, whilst the 7th bracket ends up losing a redundant annual 
amount of 330 €. 
  
As said before, the total sum of the net results has to end up in a zero-summation, meaning 
that there is a total redistribution from the upper to the lower income levels.  
Graph 4 shows accurately how the redistribution affects each level of taxable income, 
starting from the lowest (1st) and finishing with the highest (9th). There is clearly a net 
positive result in every level until we reach the seventh bracket and, after that, the result 













Graph 4. Results of the tax reform on income brackets 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Although the results have been carried out by a methodological process of estimations and 
presumptions, the final effect shown in Graph 4 gives us a brief idea of how the income 
would restructure after the RBU is implemented, ending up in a more redistributing tax 
system and ultimately in a Welfare increase. 
 
 
5.1. Further considerations of the results 
 
1. Regarding the tax reform, Navarra has an advantage compared to the rest of 
Spanish regions; we enjoy a separate tax institution (Hacienda Foral) that allows our 
region to modify the Law separately from the State’s Ministerio de Hacienda, provided 
that we respect the covenant of the Convenio Económico and the LORAFNA (Ley 
Organica de Amejoramiento del Fuero, 13/1982). This principle enables our Regional 
Administration to adapt the tax system by surcharging or diminishing some pre-
established income tax rates. To negotiate the actual tax constraints would be 
crucial in order to apply any surcharge in the final tax system.  
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Mean net ex-post RBU annual result per levels of taxable income  (in euros) 
Mean net result (Gain-Loss) 
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2. The results (Graph 4) show clearly how the RBU would damage the highest levels 
of income. It is evident that any reform aiming to obtain progressive revenues from 
the tax system has to put the interest of the lowest and medium levels of income 
before the uppers. The problem in making the highest income levels to hold most 
of the taxation weight of our system has to be with, what is called, the Laffer 
Curve. According to this theory; “an excessive increase on the income tax rates 
would disincentive the people to work more and earn better wages if the next 
bracket of income compelled them to pay relatively higher taxes”. Likewise, 
increasing taxes on capital gains would incentive the individuals with big 
patrimonies to move away from their original region to others where taxes are 
lower. 
 
3. As well as possible harmful results for the Public Administration there would be a 
noticeable benefit on indirect taxes according to the systematic transmission from 
social benefit’s transfers to final expenditure in Consumption. Therefore, there 
would be non-estimated additional earnings (VAT revenues and other indirect tax 
























6. CONCLUSIONS  
 So far, and defaulting a more precisely calculus that ought to be obtained with complex 
fiscal simulators and micro-data, we have exposed a clear and simplified version of how the 
RBU would work. Together with this, we have to give some extra considerations in order 
to understand the proposal without prejudices. 
First, this is an illustrative proposal with the aim of enhancing a remarkable demand; ‘to 
guarantee the material existence of the entire society’. The difficulties arising when dealing 
with this proposal do not always come from economic criteria but also from moral 
objections.  
Also, the RBU seems even more helpful in a situation like the one created by the current 
social crisis. In that sense, we believe that the RBU could succeed during periods of 
economic stability but it is crucial in periods of severity. Beyond any economic prejudice, 
the proposal would have a direct impact in the labor system: it would recompose the social 
interest of the most vulnerable groups of the society and give them a greater bargaining 
power against labor demand. Furthermore, earning a regular public income would permit 
the recipients to plan, save, and ultimately give them an access to some elemental rights like 
housing (it is nowadays particularly harsh to rent without any family income, employment 
nor savings). The RBU also implies a major stabilization in the basic consumption to 
sustain the demand in periods of crisis (especially for vulnerable groups), avoiding a bigger 
gap in social and economic inequality. An increasing consumption capacity in the lowest 
income levels of society would straightly stimulate the aggregate demand and could re-
launch the economy. 
Of course, our last proposal could imply severe drawbacks in certain levels of income 
(specially the uppers) and thus, create cases of iniquity. Needless to say that the tax reform 
that we proposed has some very redistributive effects and could be misleading if the 
taxpayers that would hold the required extra pubic revenue to finance the RBU consider 
their ex-post situation to be extremely imbalanced. All in all, the RBU implementations 
should ultimately depend on the ‘tax awareness’ of the population and their consideration 
about the fairness of the tax system; if the RBU proposal goes in the way to increase the 
Welfare State, there may be a increasing positive consensus of fiscal well-functioning and 
people would accept to pay an extra ‘fair’ tax. 
 
36 
Finally, a public policy like the RBU would imply a radical change in the actual economic 
functioning. One of the main characteristics of the developed countries’ economies is the 
enormous bargaining power of the big corporations over the employees; when the prospect 
to be fired increases during economic severity periods, there is an extra bargaining power 
for the employer. In these cases, the RBU represents a powerful tool to equilibrate this 
worker-company relationship. Any labor demand must be good enough to compensate a 
better off for an individual that already receives public income and, at the same time, a 
guaranteed public benefit can have the perverse effect of reducing labor supply. In that 
sense, the proposed RBU goes in the way to find a better equilibrium between labor 
demand and supply. 
When proposing alternative policies there should always be priorities and in this case, the 
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